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THE PRUDENT MAN: CHARGE AND SURCHARGE
By DAvID BROFMAN
David Brofman is Judge of the Denver
County Court. He received his LL.B. de-
gree trom Westminster College of Law in
1929, served on the Denver District At-
torney's staff, and held a high administra-
tive position in the federal government. In
1948, Judge Brofman was appointed pre-
siding judge of Denver's Municipal Courts.
In 1951, he was appointed County Judge.
He has since been elected to two four
year terms in that office. Judge Brofman
is President of the Colorado Mental Health
Association, Post President of the Colo-
rado Association of County Judges, a di-
rector of the Legal Aid Society, a member
of the Colorado Bar Association Board of
Governors, a member of the A.B.A. Com-
mittee on Probate Procedure, and an ac-
tive officer of member of many other
charitable, civic and professional organi-
zations.
The events of the past several months as reflected by the financial
pages of the various news media have focused the attention of the county
court on the so-called prudent man investments statute,1 enacted in 1951
following the amendment of article V, section 36, of the Colorado Con-
stitution, in the 1950 general election.2 Since that time, the legislature
has been permitted to enact laws prescribing types or classes of invest-
ments of funds held by executors, administrators, guardians, conserva-
tors and other trustees, where the power of investment is not set out in
the instrument creating the trust.
For many years prices on the stock market have been on the rise
generally. For the first time since the enactment of the aforesaid act,
the market has taken a severe downward reaction. In the meantime,
there have been relatively few applications to the county court for orders
approving investments on the part of fiduciaries of estates. Now that
the market has dropped, it is expected that the number of such appli-
cations, as well as requests for rulings on the propriety of investments
already made, will increase. This presents the question of whether the
court should sign an order approving an investment prior to the actual
investment or whether it is the burden of the fiduciary to exercise his
own judgment without the protection afforded by prior approval by
the court, keeping in mind the provisions of the prudent man act.
The history of the prudent man rule has been long and the appli-
cation of the rule has varied considerably among the several states. The
first pronouncement of the rule in the United States was made in Massa-
chusetts in 1830 in a decision' which turned out to be the grandfather
1 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 57-3-1 to 57-3-6 (1953).
2November 7, 1950.
3 Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 461 (1830).
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of the present clay prudent man investment statutes and decisions which
prevail in the majority of the states. Of this group, fifteen of the states
have enacted prudent man investment statutes similar to the Colorado
statute,4 seven have adopted limited prudent man acts,' and several
others have the rule by virtue of judicial decisions. Needless to say, the
acts vary from state to state both in the matter of court approval and in
the applicability of the statutes to the estates involved and the types of
investments permissible. Nevertheless, the language adopted by the
legislature or by the court in each of these states bears marked resem-
blance to the Massachusetts decision mentioned.
The first appearance of the words "prudent man" in a Colorado
decision seems to have occurred in the 1899 case In re Thomas' Estate,'
which involved the investment of funds in an incompetent's estate. In
1922, the Colorado court again used the words "prudent man" as a guide
in In re Macky's Estate.7 In that case the court, in referring to the duty
of an executor to secure interest on funds in his hands during a long
delay before settlement, said:
"The rule is that it is the executor's duty, with reference to
investments, to treat the funds in his hands as an ordinarily
prudent man would treat his own; otherwise he is guilty of
negligence; he has wrapped his talent in a napkin and hidden
it in the earth and will be surcharged with what he ought to
have gained."'
In this decision the court relied on the Thomas case as authority
for other points involved, but it made no mention of that case in regard
to the prudent man rule.
Prior to the adoption of the present investment statute, Colorado
was one of several states which had enacted a "legal list" of types of
investments in which fiduciaries were permitted to invest funds belong-
ing to estates.' Of course, the list did not include stocks and bonds of
private corporations due to the constitutional prohibition prior to
1950."° The statute specifically provided for preinvestment approval by
the court in cases of investments in certain bond issues, first mortgages
and real property under lease. This statute was repealed by the law
enacting the prudent man investment act as to all fiduciaries except
those who represent beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration. 1 In
addition, the 1951 act contained a general repeal section which, in some
quarters, is believed to have effectively made the prudent man act para-
mount law in all cases where fiduciaries acquire, invest, reinvest, ex-
change, retain, sell and manage any property, real, personal or mixed,
whether other provisions relating to the same are in the statutes or not.
However, this view is somewhat complicated due to the recodification
of the laws with a single effective date for everything included in the
1953 revised statutes.
12
Thus it is that today we have a statute on the books prescribing
4 Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oklahoma. Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and Colorado.
5 Alabama, Connecticut, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and WestVirginia.
6 26 Colo. 110, 56 Pac. 907 (1899).
7 73 Colo. 1, 213 Pac. 131 (1922).
8 Id. at 6, 213 Pac. at 133.
9 Colo. Stat. Ann. c.176, § 126(4) (1935).
10 Colo. Const., art. V, § 36 (1876).
11 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1951, c. 297.
12 Creamer, Administration of Intestate Estates, 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 582 (1957).
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a broad standard of investment for fiduciaries to follow. It does not con-
tain a procedure for securing court approval before or after making
investments. Some might say that the court could conceivably hold that
approval orders are within the inherent power of the court. Decisions
construing the prudent man act are few, perhaps due to the general busi-
ness prosperity mentioned before. There is a case' 3 construing the Okla-
homa act14 in which the court, on the petition of individual co-trustees,
as opposed by a trust company co-trustee, authorized the investment of
trust funds in investment trusts, bonds of public utilities and industrial
corporations and common and preferred stock of certain private cor-
porations "upon condition that they exercise in making such invest-
ments the judgment and care which men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in
regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their
funds, considering the probable income as well as the probable safety
of their capital. ' ' 1 5 Obviously, the order, by being conditioned on follow-
ing the exact requirements of the statute, added nothing toward solving
the question whether an order of court should be or can be obtained to
protect the fiduciary. The court did indicate that the types of invest-
ments were proper if the prudent man act was followed in making the
investments.
In Colorado there is no supreme court decision concerning the 1951
statute. Since its enactment, the Denver County Court has uniformly
refused to sign an order approving investments, on the grounds that the
13 In re Flynn's Estate, 205 Okla. 311. 237 P.2d 903 (1951).
14 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60 § 161 (Cum. Supp. 1957).
15 237 P.2d at 905.
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court could not substitute its judgment for that of the fiduciary and
that the fiduciary might hide behind the order of approval in the event
of an attempted surcharge for imprudence in making an investment.
Cases on the effect of approval orders, and the failure to secure the
same, seem to vary with each change of scenery. In the main, they appear
to turn on the requirements of the statutes in the particular jurisdic-
tions. In Iowa16 where the statute provided that trust funds may be
invested in certain bonds pursuant to order of court, an order of approval
made after purchase was held to authorize such investment as if made
prior thereto. An Alaskan guardian was held to have had no protection
under an ex parte order where the statute in force required notice to
interested persons." A Vermont trustee was held not to be prejudiced
by failure to secure a statutory order permitting sale of personalty.'8
The court there held the statute to be permissive and asserted that if it
had been adhered to it would have afforded full protection to the
trustee.
In Maryland an executor's failure to secure court approval in con-
tinuing to keep funds in a savings account was held not to be a breach
of trust.19 In another case in that state, a trustee's securing a court order
was held to protect the trustee from surcharge, but the effect of failure
16 In re Lawson's Will, 215 Iowa 752, 244 N.W. 739 (1932).
11 Corcoran v. Kostrometinoff, 164 Fed. 685 (9th Cir. 1908).
Is In re Wellman's Will, 119 Vt. 426, 127 A.2d 279 (1956).
19 Zimmerman v. Coblentz, 170 Md. 468, 185 Atl. 342 (1936).
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to do so was merely to place on him the burden of proving that the
investment was proper.20
In Wisconsin, the court held that a trustee's failure to secure an
order of approval before making an investment could be considered by
the court on the question of bad faith or lack of sound discretion. 1
In an Illinois case, 2- the beneficiaries' objection on grounds that a suc-
cessor fiduciary should have sued his predecessor for making improper
investments was held to be waived or estopped where the beneficiaries
had appeared and failed to object to the final report of the prior trustee.
In New York, a decree approving testamentary trustees' accounts which
showed on their face some unauthorized investments was held to be
res adjudicata as to the propriety of the investments and the trustees
were not surchargeable for making them.2"
in summary, the general rule prior to the adoption of the prudent
man act was that the fiduciary was protected by a valid order of court
authorizing an investment where he made such investment in good faith
and without negligence. 4 The situation in Colorado is not entirely
devoid of case law. In the above mentioned case of In re Thomas' Estate,
25
the court used the following language:
"The liability of the conservator for failure to invest the
trust funds, in the absence of specific statute, should not depend
primarily upon obtaining an order to make an investment,
because if it did, the temptation would ever be present to
neglect obtaining it .... "
in the same case, the conservator claimed that he had acted on the
oral advice and suggestions of the county judge having jurisdiction of
the estate. The supreme court swept aside this contention on the basis
that the matter of investment had not been formally presented to the
court and no orders were entered of record. The high court felt that to
hold otherwise would lead only to confusion and substitute memory
for a record entry.26 As for the effect of approval of the conservator's
reports the court had this to say:
"In the absence of a statute to the contrary, periodical or
partial settlements, as evidenced by reports of conservators, are
at most, after approval by the court, but prima facie evidence
of their correctness, and may be rectified or rebutted on a final
accounting; they are not settlements, but only the exhibition
of accounts; nor judgments, being merely ex parte presenta-
tions of the status of the estate in the hands of the conserva-
tor."27
In conclusion, let it suffice to say that in the absence of a direction
to the contrary, statutory or otherwise, the county court must avoid the
possibility of an imprudent fiduciary's prevailing on the court to secure
an order approving a poor investment and then relying on the order
to defeat a proper surcharge. A Delaware chancellor as long ago as 1921
stated:
20 Johnson v. Johnson, 168 Md. 568, 179 Atl. 831 (1935).
21 United States Nat'l Bank v. Sullivan. 69 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1934).
22 Hatfield v. First Nat'l Bank, 377 Ill. App. 169. 46 N.E.2d 94 (1943).
23 In re Bannin, 142 App. Div. 436, 127 N.Y. Supp. 92 (lst Dep't 1911).
24 See cases cited in Annot., 88 A.L.R. 325 (1934).
25 26 Colo. 110, 56 Pac. 907 (1899).
26 Id. at 121, 56 Pac. at 911.
27 Id. at 126, 56 Pac. at 912.
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"The safer and better rule for the guidance of the court
is to decline to approve of investments in advance.
"Trustees are selected because of their supposed ability to
manage the affairs of their trusts in a business like way, and
with due regard to the safety and profitable investment of the
funds committed to their custody. Not only is good faith re-
quired of them, but also that degree of diligence and prudence
which should characterize intelligent, careful and vigilant men
in the successful conduct of their own affairs. The selection of
an individual to serve as trustee presupposes the existence in
him of these qualities. Possessing them, he is entirely qualified
to pass on investments in the first instance and should be will-
ing, if he contemplates departing from the list of securities spe-
cifically designated by the statute, to assume the burden of
responsibility without asking the court to do so for him. Such
course would be the best sort of evidence of the faith of the
trustee in the safety and propriety of the investment, for unless
there is such faith in the investment, it is not to be assumed
that the trustee would incur the personal risk of making it ...
Trustees must carry the investment burden of the funds. They
cannot expect the Chancellor to assume it for them."2 8
Although this case arose under a different type of statute the gist
of the opinion seems appropriate under the present circumstances in
Colorado.
28 In re Conwell, 13 Del. Ch. 55, 115 A l. 309 (1921).
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DISCLAIMERS IN ESTATE PLANNING
By CHARLES E. WORKS
Charles E. Works is a Professor of Law
at the University of Denver College of
Law. He received his A.B. degree from
Harvard University in 1920, and his
LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1922.
Since then he has practiced law in
Denver, has served as an Assistant
United States Attorney, and has
worked as an attorney in the Colorado
Revenue Department. During World
War II he was for a time Supervisor of
all Military Government Courts in the
U.S. Army zone of Germany. Professor
Works has been a full time law teacher
since 1948. He is an active member of
the Colorado, Denver and American
Bar Associations and is Chairman of the
Colorado Bar Association's Section on
Probate and Trust Law.
A 1957 Colorado statute' permitting disclaimers of testamentary
gifts has aroused sufficient curiosity among Colorado lawyers to justify
a brief discussion of the effect of disclaimers and the situations in which
they may be used to advantage. The terms "disclaimer" and "renuncia-
tion" have been used interchangeably to refer to the refusal to accept a
power over, or title to, property so as to prevent its vesting in the dis-
claimant. A disclaimer must be distinguished from the transfer or release
of a power over, or title to, property which has already vested, thereby
creating rights and liabilities.
DISCLAIMER BY AN HEIR
Although there is a vociferous dissent,2 the great majority of text
writers and American cases say that the law is well settled that there can
be no disclaimer by an heir of property received under the intestacy
laws.' The reasons for this rule are derived from the feudal real property
system, but, nevertheless, the rule is applied to personalty as well as to
1 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 298. "152-5-44. Disclaimer.-Any person who
may be entitled to receive any property or beneficial interest, vested or otherwise,
under a devise, bequest, legacy or other testamentary disposition in any will of a
decedent dying after the effective date of this act shall have the right to disclaim
irrevocably the whole or any part of such property or beneficial interest. Such
irrevocable disclaimer must be made in writing and filed in the county court in which
such will is admitted to probate not later than six months after such will has been
admitted to probate. Any property or beneficial interest so disclaimed shall pass in
the same manner as if the person disclaiming had predeceased such decedent, unless
otherwise provided by the will in which case the will shall be controlling. Nothing in
this section shall prevent a testator from providing in a will for the making of dis-
claimers and for the disposition of disclaimed property in a manner different from the
provisions hereof."
2 Roehner and Roehner, Renunciation as Taxable Gift-An Unconstitutional Fed-
eral Tax Decision, 8 Tax L. Rev. 289 (1953); Roehner, Can Heir Renounce Without
Gift Tax?, 96 Trusts and Estates 1158 (1957).
3 4 Page, Wills § 1402 (3d ed. 1941); Lauritzen, Only God Can Make an Heir, 48




realty. Upon death intestate, the title to realty vests in the heir as a
matter of law. The legal title to personalty passes to the administrator,
but the beneficial interest passes to the next of kin as a matter of law.
No act of the heir or next of kin can prevent the vesting of title; conse-
quently, he cannot prevent his creditors' reaching the property.' If he
attempts to disclaim, he is making a transfer of property owned by him
which is taxable as a gift.' It logically follows that a disclaimer will not
avert an inheritance tax on the property received by the disclaimant,
and that, if the attempted disclaimer is made in contemplation of death,
it is a transfer subject to inheritance and estate taxes. This would appear
to be the law in Colorado.
DISCLAIMER BY A DEVISEE OR LEGATEE
The right to disclaim a testamentary gift is almost universally up-
held by the courts, including those of Colorado.' Obviously, a legatee or
devisee cannot be compelled to accept a burdensome gift, e.g., a devise
of land with an obligation to make certain payments or a bequest of bank
stock subject to a shareholder's liability. The rationale is that a testa-
mentary gift is not complete until accepted. Therefore, the donee has
an election to reject within a reasonable time and the rejection will
relate back to the date of death.7 Even though the title to personal prop-
erty vests in the executor and the title to land vests in the devisee, the
right to disclaim is the same in both instances.' Although there is a pre-
sumption that a gift is beneficial and that the donee accepts, a donee
may disclaim a beneficial gift involving no obligations.
EFFECT AS TO CREDITORS
By the great weight of authority the beneficiary's creditors are de-
feated by a disclaimer, and the beneficiary may disclaim solely for the
purpose of defeating creditors.' He is not making a fraudulent "transfer"
since he never had title. The effect of the disclaimer is that the gift lapses.
EFFECT AS TO INHERITANCE TAX ON LEGATEE
An inheritance tax is imposed on the person receiving property from
a decedent. Since the disclaimant does not receive title to the property
(or, on the theory of some of the cases, receives a title at the decedent's
death which is divested by a disclaimer that relates back to the decedent's
death), there is no inheritance tax on the disclaimant. The tax is im-
posed on the person actually receiving the property regardless of whether
this results in a greater or lesser tax and regardless of whether the dis-
claimer was made to save taxes.1
4 Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7 N.W.2d 729 (1943); Bostian v. Milens, 239
Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W.2d 797 (1946).
5 Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 73 S. Ct.
45: Maxwell v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
5 Jugoslavia v. Jovanovich, 100 Colo. 406, 69 P.2d 311 (1937); Hale v. Wheeler, 108
Colo. 119, 114 P.2d 566 (1941) (dictum); Proceedings, A.B.A. Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust 28 (1952); Black, The Effect of Renunciations and Compromises
on Death and Gift Taxes, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 241 (1950); Howe, Renunciation by the
Heir, Devisee or Legatee, 42 Ky. L. J. 605 (1954); Lauritzen, Only God Can Make an
Heir, 48 Nw. U. L. Rev. 568 (1953). Lauritzen, The Heir, the Gift Tax and the Constitu-
tion, 1 Tax Counsellor's Q. No. 3, 19 (Sept. 1957); Smith, Renunciation and Dis-
claimers, 96 Trusts and Estates, 744 (1957); Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1047 (1950).
7 3 American Law of Property 628 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 Page, Wills § 1404 (3d ed.
1941). This is the same rule that applies to an intcr-vivos gift either of realty or
personalty,
8 4 Page, Wills § 1402 (3d ed. 1941).
9 E.g., Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922). Contra, In re
Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940).




INHERITANCE TAX IN CASE OF A COMPROMISE SETrLEMENT
Vhere an heir contests or threatens to contest a will, and the legatee
gives up part of his legacy to settle the heir's claim, the situation is similar
to a partial disclaimer. The majority of courts impose the inheritance
tax on the legatee as the property would have passed under the will,
regardless of any compromise settlement, treating the legatee as having
accepted the benefits of the legacy and having contracted to transfer
part of the benefits.1 A minority of courts impose the tax on the actual
recipients under the agreement." Colorado has followed the minority
view" but in a case where the person taking under the compromise with
the legatee was the same person who would have taken in case the legatee
had disclaimed. This was in essence a partial disclaimer. The fact that
there was consideration should make no difference as to the inheritance
tax effect if the settlement was bona fide.
TAX ON LEGATEE'S DEATH
If the legatee disclaims and later dies, there may be a contention
that the disclaimer was a transfer in contemplation of death resulting
in a federal estate tax or Colorado inheritance tax on the disclaimant's
death. In the leading case of Brown v. Routzahn, 4 the Sixth Circuit held
that a disclaiming legatee and devisee had never received title and so
had not made a transfer which could be taxed its a transfer in contem-
11 E.g., Baxter v. Treasurer, 209 Mass. 459, 95 N.E. 854 (1911).
12 Black, The Effect of Renunciations and Comprowises on Death and Gift Taxes,
3 Vand. L. Rev. 241, 253, 257 (1950).
13 People v. Rice. 40 Colo. 508, 91 Pac. 33 (1907).
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plation of death. The same result should be reached under the Colorado
inheritance tax law. The disclaimer of a general power of appointment
is not treated as a transfer under the present provisions of the federal
estate tax law. 5
GIFT TAX ON DISCLAIMANT
The Routzahn case is clear authority that the disclaimer of a testa-
mentary gift is not a transfer; it follows that there can be no gift tax
because of the disclaimer, either under federal or Colorado law. The
proposed federal regulations expressly provide that the complete renun-
ciation within a reasonable time of a gift, bequest or inheritance, if,
under local law title does not immediately vest, is not a gift.1" Thus it
seems to be settled that a complete disclaimer of a legacy made in con-
formity with the Colorado statute would not be a taxable gift. However,
these regulations purport to tax partial disclaimers by legatees and all
disclaimers by devisees. Since the reasons for not imposing the tax on
complete disclaimers seem equally valid in the case of partial disclaimers,
those reasons are worth considering.
We have seen that a legatee or devisee who disclaims is treated by
the law of most states as never having owned the property. As the gift
tax is imposed on "the transfer of propery,"" it seems difficult to say
that one can be taxed as having made either a direct or indirect transfer
of property as to which he never had title under state property law.
It has been suggested that in the field of taxation, property law is
unimportant and whoever has "unfettered command"'" over property
should be treated as its owner for gift tax purposes.'" It is true that if
A transfers property to T in trust to pay the income to B and reserves a
power of revocation, A makes a taxable gift whenever T pays income to
B. 2 While A never had title to the income, he did have title to the corpus
and is treated as still its owner and, by creating the trust, he caused the
income to be paid to B. The results are different if S, a third person,
transfers property to T in trust to pay the income to B and gives A a
power to appoint the corpus to himself. While A is treated as the owner
for income tax purposes and must pay an income tax on the income
paid to B, 2 A is not treated as the owner for gift tax purposes. A's mere
failure to exercise his power over the property is not a taxable transfer.2
If the income tax doctrine of treating as an owner the person who
has been given control over property by someone else"a is to be carried
J1nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041(a)(2).
N6 Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1(c) (1957). "The renunciation of a vested
property interest, such as the interest of an heir or next-of-kin, or devisee in whom
title immediately vests upon a decedent's death under local law, constitutes a gift to
those persons who receive the property interest by means of the renunciation. On the
other hand the renunciation of a gift, bequest, or inheritance, if under local law title
does not immediately vest, is not a gift if the renunciation is complete, and is made
within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the interest. The renun-
ciation must be unequivocal and effective under local law. A renunciation is a com-
plete and unqualified refusal to accept the property to which one is entitled. There
can be no renunciation of property after its acceptance. A renunciation of only a
portion of the property is not a complete and unqualified refusal to accept the prop-
erty to which one is entitled. In the absence of acts to the contrary, the failure to
renounce within a reasonable time after learning of the transfer to him will be pre-
sumed to constitute an acceptance of the property."
17 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2501.
1s Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
19 Note, 2 Vand. L. Rev. 287 (1949). See also Kay, Renunciations, Disclaimers and
Releases, 35 Taxes 767 (1957).
20 Commissioner v. Warner, 127 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1942).
21 Richardson v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1941).
22 Mabel F. Grasselli, 7 T.C. 255 (1946).
2:? Int. Rev. Code of 1954. q7S.
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over into the gift tax law, it should be done by Congress, not by judicial
or administrative legislation. Under the present wording of the statute
the question of title and local property law is of vital importance. As the
Board of Tax Appeals said, in holding that the relinquishment of a
general power by the donee of the power was not a taxable gift, "To
regard this as a present transfer of property is, we think, to distort the
language of the statute too far to be acceptable. ' 24 It would seem that a
creditor who lets the statute of limitations run against a solvent debtor
is not making a taxable gift.2 Where a testamentary gift to charity is
invalid under a state statute as against a widow or children, and the
widow and children waive their rights and let the charity take, the
charity does not take from them but from the decedent, and the gift is
deductible for federal estate tax purposes.26
The exercise or release of a general power is a taxable gift, but the
code expressly provides, "A disclaimer or renunciation of such a power
shall not be deemed a release of such power. '27 Is it likely that Congress
intended to tax the disclaimer of a bequest or a devise when the dis-
claimer of a general power over personalty or realty was expressly
exempted?
In attempting to tax a complete disclaimer of a devise, the Com-
missioner is making a distinction which the cases have not recognized.
24 Edith Evelyn Clark, 47 B.T.A. 865, 866 (1942).
25 Estate of Eleanor Hughes Beggs, 13 T.C. 131 (1949).
26 Dimock v. Corwin, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); Commis-
sioner v. First Nat'l Bank, 102 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1939); Humphrey v. Millard, 79 F.2d
107 (2d Cir. 1935).
27 nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2514(b).
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The Routzahn case,s involved the disclaimer of both a devise and a
bequest; the court held that there was no transfer of either one. While
it is true in most states that there is a technical vesting of legal title in
the devisee as of the date of death, a disclaimer relates back to the date
of death. The regulation does not refer to all devisees, but only to a
"devisee in whom title immediately vests upon a decedent's death under
local law.'"2 ' Evidently the Commissioner recognizes that local law will
govern. If so, in construing the regulation he should consider the local
law as to the relation back of a disclaimer and its effect on the vesting
of the title. Possibly the regulation was drafted so as to tax disclaimers
by devisees in states having statutes expressly vesting devises as of the
date of death, such as Texas."
What if there is a complete disclaimer by the beneficiary of a testa-
mentary trust of land? Apparently the regulation does not purport to
tax this since legal title does not vest in the beneficiary.
There is one situation in which neither a legatee nor a devisee can
disclaim without paying a gift tax. If the legatee or devisee would take
as heir or next of kin on failure of the bequest or devise, a disclaimer
of all rights will not prevent the title from vesting under the intestacy
laws. Consequently, the disclaimant will be subject to a gift tax."
PARTIAL DISCLAIMERS BY LEGATEES AND DEVISEES
The most serious part of the proposed regulation is that which
makes every partial disclaimer of a bequest subject to gift tax. 2 Another
sub-section of the proposed regulations declares that a partial disclaimer
of a general power of appointment is also a taxable gift." It is doubtful
that these proposed regulations would be valid in any state. Their valid-
ity is obviously questionable in Colorado because our statute, as part of
tne state's property law, permits partial disclaimers.2 4 The reasoning
given above to support complete disclaimers is equally applicable to
partial disclaimers.
In the absence of statute, a disclaimer of one of several distinct,
separate gifts in a will is valid, 1 5 but many cases hold that there cannot
be a partial disclaimer of a single bequest."c One reason given for deny-
ing partial disclaimers is that the legatee by accepting part of the gift
has exercised dominion over the entire subject of the bequest. This seems
highly artificial. However it may be sound in some instances. For ex-
ample, if the beneficiary of an insurance policy elects an option which
gives her a life income and then names the person who is to take the
remainder interest, she has exercised dominion over the whole gift and
should have to pay a gift tax as to the remainder interest." A sounder
28 Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
e9 Proposed U. S. Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1(c) (1957).
30 See Rodgers v. United States, 218 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1955).
21 Maxwell v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952); see note 3 supra.
22 See note 16 supra.
3a Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. 25.2514-3(c)(5).
34 See note 1 supra.
35 Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
Item 2 of the will gave the husband of testatrix one-third of all the real and per-
sonal property. Item 2 and a codicil gave him two houses for life. Item 3 created
a trust of the residue with the husband as income beneficiary for his life. lie re-
nounced the devise and bequest of one-third of the estate under item 2, but accepted
the other gifts under items 2 and 3. The court held that all of the gifts were separate
gifts and that the renunciation as to part of them was valid. In Town of Pepperell v.
Whipple, 327 Mass. 688, 100 N.E.2d 844 (1951) the court permitted the disclaimer of
a burdensome legacy and the acceptance of a beneficial legacy on the ground that
they were separable gifts.
36 E.g., Foulkes v. Foulkes, 173 Ark. 188. 293 S.W. 1 (1927).




reason is that, in the absence of express permission in the will to accept
part and disclaim part, it is probably contrary to the testator's intent to
permit a legatee to accept the beneficial part of a gift and to reject the
burdensome part. For example, where stock in two banks was left by
will in trust, the trust beneficiary could not disclaim as to the stock of
one bank, which was subject to an assessment, and accept as to the
stock of the other bank, which was solvent."
On the other hand, where the gift is beneficial, there is no logical
reason to hold that, while the legatee may disclaim the entire gift, he
may not disclaim a fraction of it. Where a legatee disclaimed $400,000
of a $1,000,000 legacy with the result that the 1100,000 disclaimed went
to a charity, the partial disclaimer was held valid and only $600,000 was
subject to tederai estate tax.:", In a leading New York case, a disclaimer
of two-thirds of a legacy was held valid and the legatee had to pay an
inheritance tax on only the one-third accepted."' If the will expressly
authorizes a partial disclaimer, there seems to be no sound reason why
such a disclaimer should not be valid.
In People v. Rice," the Colorado Supreme Court held, where the
sole heir contested a will and part of the residuary estate was paid to
hin in settlement, that the inheritance tax was imposed on the heir as
to the settlement he received and on the legatees as to only the net
received by them. In essence, this amounted to the recognition of a par-
tial disclaimer. Thus it seems that the recent Colorado disclaimer statute
merely reaffirms what has been the law and makes provision as to the
time, manner and effect of disclaiming.
It would seem clear that a disclaimer, complete or partial, would
not be taxable under the Colorado gift tax law. Since the disclaimant
of a devise or legacy is treated in Colorado for all purposes as if title
had never vested in him, how can the federal gift tax be collected from
him in respect to property which neither the state nor his creditors can
touch? We realize that a strong argument can be made for uniformity
of tax effects regardless of local law. However we are not here challeng-
ing Congress' power to tax disclaimers, but rather the Commissioner's
application of the existing statute to partial disclaimers. In the absence
of a United States Supreme Court decision, no one can predict with
certainty how disclaimers will ultimately be treated under the federal
gift tax law.
DISPOSITION OF DISCLAIMED PROPERTY
The Colorado statute permits the testator to specify a different man-
ner of disclaiming from that set out in the statute and a different dispo-
sition of the disclaimed property. Whenever there is a possibility that a
future disclaimer may be desirable, it is suggested that the will authorize
a complete or partial disclaimer in the manner provided by the Colorado
statute or in some other specific manner. Unless some other disposition
is desired, the will should provide that the interest disclaimed shall pass
in the same manner as if the person disclaiming had predeceased the
testator. The expression of an affirmative intent in the will can do no
harm and precludes any argument that the testator might have had a
contrary intent.
There is very little authority as to whether the beneficiary of a
38 Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A.2d 9 (1939).
39 Commissioner v. Macauley's Estate, 150 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1945).
40 In re Merritt's Estate, 155 App. Div. 892, 140 N.Y. Supp. 13 (1st Dep't 1913).
41 40 Colo. 508, 91 Pac. 33 (1907).
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spendthrift trust may, or may not, disclaim and the Colorado statute
makes no express reference to this situation. Whenever a will creates a
spendthrift trust, it would be advisable to provide expressly as to the
right of the beneficiary to disclaim.
If a descendant of the testator is a legatee and disclaims, will his
issue take under the anti-lapse statute? Apparently the issue would take
under the Colorado statute, but it would seem advisable to cover this
situation by express provision in the will.
As we have seen, there can be no disclaimer in case of property
passing by intestacy. If a testator is leaving all his property or his residuary
estate to a child who might wish to disclaim, it would be advisable to
provide that if the legacy lapses it will pass to the legatee's issue. Thus,
if a legatee disclaims, an intestacy would be avoided and the disclaimer
would not be subject to gift tax.
PRACTICAL USE OF DISCLAIM ,ERS
Since a legatee, the beneficiary of a trust, and possibly a, devisee
may make a complete disclaimer without gift tax liability, and. possibly
may make a partial disclaimer without gift tax liability, it becomes perti-
nent to inquire as to the situations in which a disclaimer may be used
to advantage. Even if there is a certainty or a possibility of gift tax lia-
bility, the disclaimer may still, in some circumstances, be useful for non-
tax reasons..
An obvious situation in which the legatee might wish to disclaim is
one in which the legatee has creditors who could reach his interest and
exhaust all or part of it. This is especially true where the legacy would
go to the legatee's family in case of a disclaimer. Whatever the morality
of disclaiming in such a situation might be-and that might vary accord-
ing to the total fact situation-the legality is unquestionable except in a
few jurisdictions.2
Whenever a legatee desires to make a gift of his legacy, or part of it,
to the next taker, it may be cheaper to disclaim than to accept and then
make a taxable gift. For example, if a will leaves personal property to the
testator's surviving children and one child is wealthy and wants his less
fortunate brothers and sisters to have his share in equal proportions,
a complete disclaimer will accomplish the result with no unfavorable
tax effects. Of course, if the wealthy child wishes to divert his legacy in
any other manner or to different persons he cannot do so by a disclaimer,
but will have to accept the legacy and make a taxable gift.
The wealthy legatee may wish to divert his legacy for tax reasons.
If the legacy, in case of disclaimer, will pass to the legatee's issue, a dis-
claimer will put the property in the next generation without any income,
estate, inheritance or gift tax effects on the legatee. In this situation the
legatee may desire to accept part of the legacy to insure his protection in
his old age and make only a partial disclaimer. Since the inheritance tax
exemptions and rates depend on the number of recipients and their
relationship to the decedent, a disclaimer may affect the total amount
of inheritance taxes paid as well as determining by whom they are paid.
If a disclaimer of a bequest, legacy, devise or power is made before
the time for filing the federal estate tax return, and the disclaimed prop-
erty passes to charity because of the disclaimer, a charitable deduction
may be claimed with a resulting decrease in the amount of the estate tax.43
42 See note 9 supra.
43 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2055.
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Perhaps the most frequent occasion for employing a disclaimer will
be in connection with the marital deduction. If the will gives a widow
(or widower) more than one-half of the testator's estate in a manner
qualifying for the marital deduction, the total estate taxes in the estates
of the two spouses will be excessive because the estate of the widow will
be thrown into an unnecessarily high bracket. The same unfavorable
tax result may occur if the widow has separate property of her own, even
if her husband's will leaves her only one-half of his estate. In these situa-
tions a partial disclaimer enables the widow to do some advantageous
tax planning in the light of the circumstances existing after her hus-
band's death. If a partial disclaimer is used, care must be taken as to
what property is disclaimed. Under the usual tax formula clause a dis-
claimer of non-probate property, such as life insurance, may not reduce
the amount of property qualifying for the marital deduction.
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There are special provisions in the code as to disclaimers and the
marital deduction. If the surviving spouse disclaims, the marital deduc-
tion is lost as to the disclaimed property; but if the property passes to
the surviving spouse by reason of a disclaimer by a third person there
can be no marital deduction, as the property is treated as passing from
the third person and not from the decedent." These provisions are incon-
sistent; they can be explained on the ground that they are not imposing
taxes, but are dealing with deductions which are a matter of legislative
grace.
At least one authority in this field believes that there is some danger
that a partial disclaimer might be subject to gift tax as the exercise of a
power of appointment. 5 Professor William J. Bowe has suggested that,
instead of the partial disclaimer device, a will might leave to the surviv-
ing spouse an election of three gifts of different size, each qualifying for
the marital deduction. 6 This would seem to be foolproof so far as a
possible tax on the surviving spouse is concerned. Of course, its limit of
choices gives less flexibility, but it would undoubtedly be satisfactory in
many cases. If so worded that the largest gift passes on failure to elect,
it has not avoided the partial disclaimer problem. Because of the possi-
bility of the surviving spouse dying shortly after the testator or being
mentally incapacitated, it might be risky not to make some provision
for a definite gift to the surviving spouse in the absence of an election.
In any event a provision authorizing a partial disclaimer can do no
harm in itself and by the time the testator dies the law may be clarified
as to whether a partial disclaimer is subject to gift tax.
CONCLUSION
Disclaimers can unquestionably be used in certain circumstances to
obtain some tax advantages and sometimes to accomplish other purposes.
The 1957 Colorado statute increases the possibility that a complete dis-
claimer of a devise and a partial disclaimer of a legacy or a devise may
be made without subjecting the devisee or legatee to a federal or Colo-
rado gift tax. It is more important than ever for attorneys to consider
disclaimer possibilities and effects, in planning estates, in drafting wills
4 7
and inter-vivos trusts, and in the post-death planning incident to han-
dling the affairs of beneficiaries of a decedent's estate.
44 Id. § 2056(d)(1) and (2).
45 Trachtman, Estate Planning 40-44 (1955).
46 Bowe, Estate Planning and Taxation § 2.20 (1957).
47 Provisions for disclaimers and partial disclaimers must be drafted to fit the
particular facts. The following is a clause which might be satisfactory in some, but
not in all, wills creating a marital deduction trust and a non-qualifying trust: "My
wife, Mary Doe, shall have the power to disclaim, at any time within six months
after this will has been admitted to probate, her interest in and power over, the
whole or any part of, the property in the trust created by this paragraph I. In that
event, the property, or the portion thereof, to which such disclaimer pertains, shall
be added to the John Doe Family Trust created by this will to be disposed of as
though it had been a part of said trust from the date of my death. In addition to any
method of disclaimer recognized by law, my said wife may disclaim by an instrument
in writing signed by her and delivered either to my Executors or to my Trustees
hereunder."
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